Tag Archives: Small Wars Journal

Using the Army to stop the Tea Party

Nevermind the Pentagon striking the word jihad from the military lexicon, at Obozo’s order, thereby eliminating references to a genuine threat.

How about this new effort by a retired Army colonel and a University of Kansas historian? They wrote an Army War College scenario telling how the military can take over the role of the civilian police and quash a right-wing Tea Party takeover of an American town.

“In May 2016 an extremist militia motivated by the goals of the “tea party” movement takes over the government of Darlington, South Carolina, occupying City Hall, disbanding the city council, and placing the mayor under house arrest…”

The Occupy Movement, composed of genuine thugs, rapists and assorted felons, isn’t mentioned. Well, they had Obozo’s backing.

The colonel and the professor, not to mention the War College, really need to stop watching MSNBC as much as they apparently do. Waste of time, folks. And more: it’s criminally stupid.

This little scenario, alone, is going to cost you in credibility and respect from the American people, without whose continuing regard the military cannot succeed at anything.

Civil wars in Mexico

Well, not quite, but almost. Couple of good notices lately, one at the Small Wars Journal and one from Stratfor, of the increasing drug wars going on in Mexico, corrupting their government and spilling over our southern border. If the Mexican government becomes thoroughly, instead of merely traditionally, corrupt, then what do we do? It seems we may have to put troops on the border not just to halt illegal immigration but to keep the Mexican drug wars from invading us as well. I still say, as I have all along, that the only solution is the only one that won’t be tried: full legalization as was done with alcohol with similar restrictions, but prices kept artificially low. Then concentrate on treatment, education and enforcement of DUI laws.

The Advisory Corps

This is an idea advocated by John Nagl at Small Wars Journal which makes a lot of sense to this old Army advisor in Vietnam. The role has never been more important, as American counterinsurgency advisors have helped turn around the Iraq campaign and could do the same in Afghanistan. In any case, they will be the last Americans assigned, assisting and training the indigenous armies we leave behind to defend their own countries.

But, as in Vietnam, where the effort was later termed "the other war," as if it wasn’t very important, it seems today’s Army is being even more ad hoc about it. I got pulled out of a cav regiment for a job advising a couple of companies of Regional Forces and Popular Forces militia known as the Rough-Puffs. We did some training for them, but, with little experience and limited language skills, we hardly ever actually advised the SVN lieutenants and sergeants who ran the patrols and night ambushes. They were usually older and had more combat experience than we did.

I was one of the lucky ones who attended the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg where many of our instructors were Special Forces though we were not. The current advisory crop apparently has less training and one of the same disadvantages, i.e. being outside normal channels, making the assignment no plum for careerists. Advisory work in Vietnam was not even considered command time for line promotion. An Advisory Corps, with permanent units with esprit, etc., could change that.

It also might improve on what me and my five-man team of two officers and three NCOs primarily did. We mainly called in artillery, airstrikes and medevac as needed. Artillery was useful, if the regular unit guns we called were good. Air strikes were, then, usually flown by F4 Phantoms and were often inaccurate. American medevacs, however, were prized, as the SVN troops were afraid of their own medical corps. Our dustoffs would land in the midst of a fight at night. The SVNs would come, if at all, only in the day. Their soldiers also knew their doctors would quickly amputate a wounded limb, which American docs would try to save.

The Internet, of course, is a superlative resource for all deployed soldiers which we would have loved to have had forty years ago, so the current crop of advisors is luckier, in that way, for things such as this nice collection of advisor advice available with one click. 

Gori, Georgia

Are the Russians still in Gori, or have they left Gori? Have they agreed to leave Gori, or have they refused to leave Gori? The MSM is all over the place on those questions, trying to be authoritative when they obviously have no idea what is going on. Probably because the Pentagon, despite repositioning spy satellites to see what’s going on, doesn’t know, either.

Via Small Wars Journal.

Counterinsurgency

Here’s an idea many former Army advisors can get behind. In essence, Green Berets on the cheap.

"…just as the new realities of warfare demanded the creation of the Special Forces in the 1960’s, winning the Long War will require that the Army develop a standing Advisor Corps.  It has been informed by the experience of many advisors with service in Iraq and Afghanistan…"

Trust

Bing West at the Small Wars Journal offers insight from a recent trip to Iraq:

"Trust will decide this war. We know the essence of the problem: Whether the Iraqi central government and security forces are led by deceivers who tell us they believe in a stable federation with power-sharing, while they abet sectarian division. In my most recent visit, there was the pervasive, open acknowledgement by the police, IA and the residents that they trusted the Americans, but not each other."

The plan behind the “no plan”

Bush’s Democrat and Republican critics have repeated the same canard now over and over again for years: Bush has no plan, no coherent strategy for Iraq. It’s all hit or miss, etc.

Former Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan even quotes Nebraska Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel reiterating the notion and praises him for having the guts to speak out–even if a quick stroll through the Small Wars Journal could have shown her that his supposedly gutsy move was based on a false assumption.

Some of the journal’s counterinsurgeny strategists, at least, have done their homework and concluded that there not only is a plan, and a coherent strategy, in Bush’s "surge," with its focus on securing the population of Bahgdad and al-Anbar, but that it has a track record of success:

"The new strategy reflects counterinsurgency best practice as demonstrated over dozens of campaigns in the last several decades: enemy-centric approaches that focus on the enemy, assuming that killing insurgents is the key task, rarely succeed. Population-centric approaches, that center on protecting local people and gaining their support, succeed more often…in the new strategy what matters is providing security and order for the population, rather than directly targeting the enemy – though this strategy will effectively marginalize them."

It’s also significant that the Army’s guru of counterinsurgency, Gen. David Petreaus, will be the one to implement the new approach. Read it all here